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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
SARAH MARGARET DEWEESE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STA'rEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
100917 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
Appellant's statement of facts is characterized by 
misinterpretation of the evidence, and by unwarranted 
inferences. This is true even though plaintiff as the pre-
vailing party is entitled to a consideration of the evidence 
and inferences in a light most favorable to her. We, 
therefore, deem it necessary to restate the facts. 
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2 
B. THE FACTS 
Sarah !Iargaret DeWeese brought this action for 
personal injuries received from slipping and falling 
on the terrazzo entranceway to defendant's store at 213 
South !fain Street on November 30, 1953. At that time 
the DeWeese family lived at 1275 E1nerson Avenue and 
had lived in Salt Lake City for a little over a year (R. 17, 
70). On the evening of November 30, 1953, Mrs. De-
'V eese went to town in order to do some shopping and 
meet her husband after work. Her husband was the 
Assistant Manager of the W. T. Grant store. He was 
scheduled to get off work at between 9 :15 and 9 :30 P.M. 
(R. 17). Mrs. DeWeese caught a bus at 13th East and 
Emerson A venue. Emerson A venue is located between 
13th and 17th South Streets. Plaintiff boarded the bus 
at around 8:00 P.M. She stated that after the bus had 
traveled from one to one and a half blocks, it started to 
snow, with large flakes melting as they hit the ground 
(R. 18). She dismounted from the bus at Second South 
and State. It was still snowing at that time. 
She stated that it ~usually takes the bus from 
fifteen to twenty minutes to take her to town (R. 34). 
Mrs. DeWeese, afer getting off the bus, walked from 
State Street to :Niain Street and turned South on Main 
Street, proceeding to defendant's store. As she walked 
from State Street to J. C. Penney's she noticed that the 
sidewalks were damp and wet to the point where, al-
though water was not running off the sidewalk in a heavy 
flow, there would be puddles in breaks in the sidewalk 
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(R. 18, 35). Plaintiff was holding her hand over her 
hair to keep it dry and it still got wet (R. 37). She noticed 
as she started in the entranceway that there was an in-
cline and that the terrazzo was damp and wet (R. 19). 
'Vhen she had walked from two to five feet on the 
terrazzo, her right foot suddenly slipped forward, and 
she fell straight down with her left leg folded under 
(R. 20). When plaintiff fell, she noticed that there were 
some 1nuddy streaks on the surface of the terrazzo, ap-
parently tracks of people walking in and out (R. 39). 
There were customers standing around in the entrance-
way, one of whom helped her up. She then limped into 
the store. There were muddy stains on her leg, slip and 
the inside lining of her coat and dress (R. 21). Inside 
the store, plaintiff told the girl at the glove counter of 
her fall and asked to use the telephone. She called her 
husband at Grant's and he immediately came up to Pen-
ney's. As l\ir. De vVeese left Grant's and proceeded to J. 
C. Penney's, he noticed that it was ~nowing large flakes, 
which were not sticking and that the sidewalk was wet 
(R. 79). As he entered the entranceway of Penney's on 
the terrazzo "pretty fast," he almost slipped and fell him-
self, "it was that slick" (R. 80). Mr. DeWeese noticed 
that there was no rubber mat on the surface of the ter-
razzo (R. 82). Jack Davies, an employee of defendant, 
approached Mrs. DeWeese and asked her if there were 
rubber mats on the entranceway, and she answered in 
the negative (R. 21, 83). Davies then went to the front 
door and looked out. He came back past Mr. and Mrs. 
DeWeese, went into a closet and came back with a bucket 
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filled with a white powdery substance known to Mr. 
De \Veese as feldspar, took it out to the terrazzo and 
spread it on the surface (R. 22, 84). While this was going 
on, ~fr. and l\tfrs. De \Yeese were at the glove counter just 
inside the door (R. 82). 
From this fall ~Irs. De vV eese suffered a severe in-
jury to the lumbosacral area of her back. The medical 
evidence is that as a result of her injuries it will be 
necessary for her to undergo a spinal fusion operation 
(R. 57). 
T,errrazzo surfaces beoome slippery when wet 
Frank Caffall had been employed as a tile contractor 
1n Salt Lake City for some forty-three years. During 
that time he had done quite a few jobs of laying terrazzo 
surfaces. He testified that terrazzo is made of cement, 
marble chips and a suitable color, and is laid in a plastic 
form. After it is set, it is ground with carborundun1 stones 
with electric machines, using a finer grit as the grinding 
proceeds to give it a smooth surface and a polish (R. 93, 
94). Caffall testified that terrazzo without non-slip ma-
terial such as carborundum and London grit is very slick 
and that the addition of non-slip material will make it 
less slick. He further stated that water or moisture on 
the surface of terrazzo with grit will make the surface 
more slippery. A small amount of water will make the 
surface slicker than a large amount of water for the 
reason that a small amount of water will not clean off the 
film of mud or other impurities which increase slipperi-
ness (R. 95, 97, 103, 104). Mr. Caffall stated at R. 103: 
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"Then, when the terrazzo is combed down 
smooth and it has these grits in there, the grits, 
of course, are exposed to your feet as you walk 
across them, and when they get damp, of course, 
they get more slick. The material is more slick." 
Further, Caffall testified that ordinary wear and use of 
a terrazzo surface over a long period of time makes the 
surface smoother and also wears smoother any grit ma-
terial in the terrazzo (R. 99, 102). Caffall testified that 
although other surface materials such as cement may be 
as slippery when wet as terrazzo, the slipperiness when 
wet will increase with the smoothness of the finish (R. 
100, 101, 103). 
On cross examination, Caffall testified (R. 101) : 
"Q. You know, from what you have gathered that 
a cement sidewalk and terrazzo surface have 
approximately the same coefficient of friction 
when wet? 
A. Well, I can't answer that 'yes' or 'no', de-
pends upon the smoothness of it and how it 
has been ground down. Cement can he-can 
be ground down very smooth and be very 
slippery, same as terrazzo. ·Either one of 
them can be left rough with abrasive in them 
and be more non-slick." 
Peter Evans had been employed by W. T. Grant 
Company for 24 years performing duties in maintenance 
of building and equipment. During this time he observed 
the terrazzo surfaces of the entranceway of Grant's and 
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other stores in downtown Salt Lake. From such observa-
tions he was well acquainted with the general propensi-
ties of terrazzo (R. 91, 92). Evans testified at R. 92: 
"Q. Now, based upon your experience and your 
observations with respect to terrazzo, gen-
erally, can you state what, if any, effect water 
or wetness has on a terrazzo surface f 
A. Makes it slippery." 
Prior to coming to Salt Lake City in October of 1952 
as Assistant Manager, Mr. DeWeese had worked for 
W. T. Grant Company as a trainee manager and assistant 
manager at Roanoke, Virginia, Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, Richmond, Virginia, Williamsburg, Virginia, Win-
chester, Virginia, Newport News, Virginia, and Atlanta, 
Georgia. At the time of trial he was Manager of theW. 
T. Grant store at Bellflower, California. At these vari-
ous stores Mr. De Weese had become acquainted with 
terrazzo surfaces as a part of his duties and stated that 
water or moisture on these surfaces makes them slick. 
Rubber Mats and/or anti-slip compounds in common US'e 
will eliminate slipperiness of wet terrazzo surfaces 
Peter Evans testified as to the means and measures 
generally used to reduce slipperiness of terrazzo surfaces 
caused by wetness. He stated that the means he had be-
come acquainted with were putting out rubber mats and 
using an anti-slip compound known as "feldspar." Feld-
spar is a gritty granulated substance made of ground 
granite. He stated that this substance acts as a brake 
on slipperiness (R. 92, 93). 
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Caffall testified that he had had occasion to make a 
general survey of the business establishments on Main 
Street and that about 85 percent had terrazzo entrances 
(R. 94). 
:Mr. DeWeese testified from his experience that rub-
ber mats or abrasive anti-slip compounds were available 
for use on terrazzo surfaces to correct any slickness 
caused by moisture or water, that these devices were in 
common use and would make it next to impossible to slip 
(R. 77). He stated that the two most commonly used 
compounds are "feldspar" and "Never Slip." From his 
experience in Salt Lake City, both before and after his 
wife was injured, DeWeese observed that most business 
establishments on Main Street between South Temple 
and Third South used rubber mats in inclement weather 
(R. 78). He stated that theW. T. Grant Company used 
both rubber mats and feldspar on its terrazzo entrance-
way during the time that he was employed there. 
The custom and practice at J. C. Penney Company 
was to use rubber mats and/ or non-slip compound on its 
terrazzo in inclement weather. This is indicated by 
Davies' words and actions immediately following Mrs. 
De \Veese's fall. One of the first questions Davies asked 
l\Irs. DeWeese was if the rubber mats were out (R. 21, 
83). Then Davies proceeded out to see the terrazzo and 
went back to a closet, where he obtained a bucket filled 
with a white powdery substance, which Mr. DeWeese 
recognized as "feldspar." Davies took the bucket out to 
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the terrazzo and spread "feldspar" on the entranceway 
(R. 84). Davies was not called as a witness by defendant 
nor were any other of defendant's employees called to 
testify. Furthermore, Defendant in its brief (P. 19, 20) 
admitted that J. C. Penney Company had such a custom. 
Defendant's terrazzo entranceway was wet and slippery 
at the time plaintiff was injured 
Mrs. DeWeese testified as to her fall, as follows (R. 
20): 
"Q. Will you state exactly what happened as you 
proceeded into the north entrance-way there? 
A. I was just walking along normally, minding 
my own business, and I noticed the floor was 
wet, but never thought about it being slick or 
anything like that. 
Q. And what happened? 
A. And the next thing I knew, I was down after 
I had gone two or three feet inside the en-
trance. 
Q. Will you describe how you came to fall¥ 
A. Well, I landed more or less like a parachute; 
everything I had went out. 
* * * * 
Q. Will you describe exactly how you fell¥ I l~ 
A. My right foot went forward and my left leg 
folded under me. 
Q. And how did you land? 
A. Flat." ra 
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And on cross examination (R. 38) : 
"Q. Mrs. DeWeese, you say your right foot slip-
ped¥ 
A. That's right. 
Q. It went forward~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Not to the rear~ 
A. Went forward. 
Q. And what happened to your left leg 1 
A. It folded under me." 
l\1rs. DeWeese noticed that the terrazzo surface was 
damp and wet. After she had fallen, she noticed some 
muddy streaks on the surface (R. 39). 
Both Mr. and I\frs. DeWeese testified that there was 
no rubber mat on the terrazzo (R. 21, 82). 
Mr. DeWeese, a few minutes after the fall, proceeded 
into the southern part of the main entrance of Penney's 
"pretty fast" and "I almost fell down myself, it was that 
slick." (R. 80). 
Mrs. DeWeese testified that there was an incline 
from commencement of the terrazzo up to the door (R. 
19). She stated at R. 30: 
"Well, it is high enough, I noticed I was going 
up an incline." 
l\1r. DeWeese testified as to the slope of the ter-
razzo (R. 80): 
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"A sloping incline, noticeable to the naked 
eye." 
It was stipulated in Court by counsel that the slope 
of the terrazzo at the point where Mrs. DeWeese slipped 
was four inches in ten feet from the sidewalk up to-
wards the door, and that the sidewalk in front of Penney's 
sloped downward to the south at a rate of 5.5 inches in 
ten feet (R. 29). As a result, Mrs. DeWeese proceeded 
from one slope to another as she stepped from the side-
walk on to the terrazzo. 
Mr. DeWeese stated that a slope on wet terrazzo 
surface, as far as footing is concerned, makes it "hard 
to walk on" (R. 81). 
Evidence was offered and received of an answer to 
an interrogatory that the terrazzo at J. C. Penney Com-
pany was installed in the year 1936 (R. 86, 87). Caffall 
testified that terrazzo surfaces become smoother with 
wear and that grit materials also wear down (R. 99). 
The entranceway in question had been remodeled 
some time before trial and a different surface is now 
on said entranceway (R. 98, 99). Caffall examined a bor-
der around the new surface. He stated that this appeared 
to be an old surface. He felt this surface and it was 
"quite smooth" (R. 100). He could not detect any London 
grit. He stated that it would be difficult to detect car-
borundum because the surface was black in color, as is 
carborundum (R. 99). 
I ~ 
I P 
I 
i \' 
I r 
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Misstatements in the Brief of Appellant 
At page 7 of the Brief of Appellant counsel states 
that :\fr. Caffall testified that "terrazzo when wet was 
just about as slippery as a sidewalk." Caffall made no 
such statement. lie testified that cement could be as 
slippery if it was ground and polished to the same degree 
(R. 101). 
On page 8 defendant claims as fact that terrazzo 
is less slippery when worn. It is true that defendant's 
paid expert slanted some answers in that direction (R. 
114) even though he made no categorical statement that 
this terrazzo would be less slippery when worn. Plain-
tiff's witness, on the other hand, stated that wear and 
use of a terrazzo surface makes it more slippery re-
gardless of the presence or absence of carborundum (R. 
99, 102) and the jury was entitled to and did believe 
plaintiff's evidence on this issue. 
On page 9, defendant states that Mrs. DeWeese "cate-
gorized" the precipitation as a "mist." This statement 
is utterly false. Mrs. DeWeese stated that the precipita-
tion was a snow that was melting before or as it hit the 
ground. The only mention made of a mist was by coun-
sel for defendant when he was taking plaintiff's deposi-
tion and was questioning her as to how wet the sidewalks 
were and she stated: "More than just being like mist 
or something like that." Counsel then asked plaintiff 
what she interpreted a mist to be. At trial when coun-
sel was cross examining Mrs. DeWeese by reading from 
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the deposition, he ornitted to read his question as to 
what she interpreted a mist to be. When this remark-
able omission was called to his attention, he inserted the 
question in the record (R. 36). It can easily be seen 
from the deposition and the record that Mrs. DeWeese 
in no way "categorized" the precipitation as a 1nist. This 
was strictly counsel's own doing. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS 
TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE. 
(a) THE EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM AND USAGE AD-
Tl 
I,. 
I . 
MITTED BY THE TRIAL ·COURT WAS PROPER. · l 
(b) DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY AD-
MISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCEDED BY DEFENSE COUN-
SEL TO BE "PERFECTLY ADMISSIBLE", AND STIPULAT- I . 
ED TO BE TRUE. I 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT IS FORECLOSED FROM OBJECTING TO 
ADMISSION OF LOCAL CUSTOM AND USAGE EVIDENCE 
BY COUNSEL'S F AlLURE TO EXCEPT TO SUCH EVI-
DENCE AND BY HIS F AlLURE TO REQUEST A LIMITING 
INSTRUCTION. 
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ARGr:MENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS 
TO DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Two cases establish the Utah law where terrazzo 
surfaces are involved. They are Erickson v. Walgreen 
Drug Co., (1951) ______ U. ______ , 232 P. 2d 210, and W. T. 
Grant Co. v. J{arren, C.C.A. lOth (1951), 190 F. 2d, 710. 
Counsel for defendant in his brief has attempted to side 
step these cases and to fit the case at bar into the clear-
ly distinguishable "puddle of water" or "foreign sub-
stance" type of case. This court specifically distin-
guished the two in the Erickson case when it stated at 
232 P. 2d 212: 
"This is not the case of a business visitor slip-
ping on some foreign substance such as oil, which 
had carelessly been spilled on the floor only a 
short time prior to the accident." 
Defendant further cites the recent case of Lindsay v. 
Eccles Hotel Company, 3 U. 2d 364, 284 P. 2d 477, as 
authority when the court specifically held it to be a 
"foreign substance" case. 
The facts in the case at bar are almost identical with 
the facts of the Erickson case. Here, as in the Erickson 
case, there was testimony that terrazzo surfaces become 
slippenr when wet. In both cases there was testimony 
that any grit material in terrazzo loses its effectiveness 
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to prevent slipping with wear. The terrazzo in the case 
at bar had been in use for approximately 14 years. In 
both cases there was evidence of a custom existing in 
Salt Lake City on Main Street for stores having terrazzo 
entrances to use rubber mats and/or non-slip aggregates. 
In the Erickson case, there was a slope of only 1/16 of an 
inch to the foot, or o/8 of an inch in ten feet. In the case 
at bar, the slope was four inches in ten feet, or nearly 
seven times as great. In the Erickson case there was no 
evidence of a custom of using rubber mats or non-slip 
aggregate at the vV algreen store entrance. In the case 
at bar there was evidence by the actions of defendant's 
employee of such a custom at J. C. Penney's. Further-
more, counsel for defendant in his brief, on page 19 
states: 
"Admittedly the defendant, J. C. Penney 
Company used mats and Feldspar during incle-
ment weather, * * *" 
Defendant maintains that there was no evidence that 
defendant's terrazzo was slick and slippery at the time 
of Mrs. DeWeese's fall. This remarkable contention ig-
nores the testimony of Mrs. DeWeese that she slipped on 
this floor, that her foot slipped right out from under 
her, and of 1\fr. DeWeese that he slipped and almost fell 
on the same terrazzo on his way in shortly after Mrs. 
DeWeese's fall, and his further testimony that this ter-
razzo surface was slick. Certainly Davies would not have 
performed the useless act of throwing feldspar on a dry 
non-slippery surface. It will be remembered that this 
II 
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surface was ren1oved and replaced some time prior to 
trial. Counsel for defendant did not offer to bring a 
piece of it to court or explain why he did not. In fact, 
the only witness produced by defendant was Dr. Harris, 
who performed laboratory tests on the terrazzo at a dif-
ferent time and under different circumstances and with-
out taking account of the slope or the problems of a 
person walking. As far as the record shows, Dr. Harris 
merely placed weights on various shoes and pushed them 
along the surface. The jury was not required to give 
any weight to such testimony. The original border of the 
terrazzo remained. Caffill examined it and stated that it 
was "quite smooth" and that he could detect no carbor-
undum. Defendant offered no testimony as to any car-
borundmn or non-slip aggregate being a component of the 
terrazzo. 
These facts provided the jury with a solid founda-
tion for finding as fact the elements required in Section 
343 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the 
Law of Torts: 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a 
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he 
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care could discover, the condition which, if known 
to him, he should realize as involving an unreason-
able risk to them, and 
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(b) has no reason to believe they will dis-
cover the condition or realize the risk involved 
therein, and 
(c) invites or permits them to enter or re-
Inain upon the land without exercising reasonable 
care 
(i) to make the condition reasonably 
safe, or 
(ii) to give a warning adequate to en-
able them to avoid the harm * * * ." 
Defendant is charged with knowledge that its ter-
razzo entranceway was ground to a smooth finish, that 
it was on a slope, and that when it became damp or wet 
the surface became dangerously slick and slippery. De-
fendant also knew that large numbers of its invitees could 
be expected at all times during business hours to be 
using its entranceway. Under these circumstances de-
fendant owed a duty of alert, attentive, watchfulness for 
signs of inclement weather as well as for inclement 
weather, so it could put out the mats and feldspar in 
plenty of time to avoid danger. Taking the evidence most 
favorable to plaintiff it had been raining and snowing 
approximately twenty minutes before plaintiff dismount-
ed from the bus at State Street and Second South. 
It had started to rain and snow when the bus had 
gone about a block or a block and a half and it usually 
took the bus fifteen to twenty minutes to make the trip 
to town. It probably took plaintiff another five or ten 
minutes to walk the block and a half to defendant's store. 
/r 
1 1 
I 
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During this twenty-five to thirty minutes customers were 
continuously walking into the store with the dampness 
and wetness on their feet, hair and clothing. The store 
had its usual employees at the front as well as the rear 
of the store. They could see out the windows. Under 
such circumstances the jury was unquestionably justified 
in finding that defendant by the exercise of reasonable 
care could have discovered the dangerous condition exist-
ing at its entranceway. It would have (aken less than a 
minute to bring out the mats and/ or sprinkle the en-
trance with feldspar, or to warn patrons of the dangerous 
condition. 
Defendant had no reason to believe that invitees 
would discover or realize the risk involved in walking on 
the terrazzo entranceway. Slickness is not a thing that 
can always be seen. It is something that is felt. Wet 
terrazzo is deceptively innocent in appearance and dan-
gerous in character. There was no evidence that plain-
tiff would have had any reason to discover that this 
entranceway was slick in time to avoid her injury. 
Plaintiff was entitled to believe that the entranceway sur-
face was safe for use unless and until a reasonably 
prudent person under like circun1stances and with like 
opportunity for observation would have concluded other-
wise. 
Defendant's doors were open. The invitation to cross 
its entranceway was extended to one and all. It was a 
busy shopping time, yet defendant made no effort what-
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soever to use readily available means to eliminate the 
danger apparent to it but not apparent to its invitees. 
Neither did defendant make any effort to give warning 
of the danger that existed. 
The facts of the Erickson case as stated on page 215 
1n the dissenting opinion show that Walgreen Drug 
Company had approximately thirty minutes in which 
to apprise itself of the situation and remedy it. It was 
stated: 
"On September 25, 1948, plaintiff left her 
home at approximately 2 :30 P.M., at which time 
it was beginning to rain. She arrived at Second 
South and l\1:ain Streets at approximately 3:00 
P.l\L The streets were wet and it was still rain-
ing." 
In the case of Brody v . .Albert Lifson & Sons, Inc., 
N.J. (1955), 111 A. 2d 504, the court recognized the dif-
ference in principle between the terrazzo case and the 
slippery foreign substance case. The court pointed out 
that in the puddle of water or foreign substance case the 
dangerous condition is ordinarily equally open to dis-
covery by both the store owner and the invitee for the 
reason that the slipperiness is caused by the puddle of 
water or foreign substance with the floor surface not hav-
ing anything to do with the dangerous condition whereas 
in the terrazzo type of case the dangerous condition is 
created by the combination of a surface having the pro-
pensity to be slick and slippery when wet and an expect-
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able action of nature. The court in the Brody case cited 
both the Erickson and the l{arren cases in affirming a 
verdict for the plaintiff. 
In the Brody case the plaintiff slipped and fell on 
defendant's terrazzo entrance after business hours. She 
had gone into defendant's lighted entranceway to see the 
display windows. The floor surface of the entranceway 
was terrazzo with a slope of 3Js of an inch to the foot, 
or 33,4 inches in 10 feet. Plaintiff's expert testified that 
the floor was considerably slippery when wet and that 
the standard practice in wet weather was to use rubber 
mats. The fall occurred on the evening of June 4, 1951, 
a warm summer night. There was conflict in the testi-
mony as to when the incident occurred and when the 
rain began. Plaintiff testified that she fell at about 8 :00 
P.M., that the sky was cloudy while she had been in 
Newark (happened in Elizabeth), and that there had 
been showers in Newark from 7 :00 P.M. on. A meteor-
ologist testified that rain began in Elizabeth at 8:30P.M., 
but this report came from Union County Park Commis-
sion. The Chief of the Union County Park Police testi-
fied that rain started at 8:10P.M., and would be reported 
on the half hour. An Elizabeth police officer testified 
that the accident was reported at 8:47 P.1\L Plaintiff 
testified that the surface of the terrazzo was wet and 
slippery. Defendant asserted that it did not have suffi-
cient notice. In answer to this assertion, the court stated 
at page 507: 
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"In the Bohm case, supra, we held that the 
duty existing, frequently the result has turned up-
on notice of the defective condition, direct or im-
puted by proof of adequate opportunity to dis-
cover the defective condition * * *. It is this 
principle that is invoked in the present case by the 
defendant. This case, however, is not subject to 
unqualified application of that philosophy. We 
have not, in the circumstances here presented, a 
defective condition arising either suddenly or by 
wear over a period of tin1e, nor an uncommon ac-· 
cumulation of water. 
"The present matter lies within the confines 
of the rule that a negligent act may be one which 
'creates a situation which involves an unreason-
able risk to another because of the expectable ac-
tions of the other * * * or a force of nature.' 
"In the present case there was evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably infer that the con-. 
struction of the floor rendered it peculiarly liable, 
to become slippery by virtue of introduction of 
water thereon and that defendant omitted pre-
cautions which would have been practical or 
reasonable under the circumstances of this case. 
* * * * 
"* * *and in the present case the alleged cause 
is the intrinsic quality of the material used or 
condition created by the defendant u·hen exposed 
to normal weather conditions. This is an intrinsic 
substance case, not a foreign substance case. 
Therefore, it is not ruled by the 'waxed floor', 
'pool of water', 'grease spot' or 'defective or worn 
tread' cases, where the foreign substance or extra-
normal condition of the premises is alleged to be 
the cause of an injury." 
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In the notice aspect of the case, the New Jersey 
Court relied on the theory set out in paragraph 302 (b) 
of the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts: 
"A negligent act may be one which: 
* * * * 
"(b) creates a situation which involves an 
unreasonable risk to another because of the ex-. 
pectable action of the other, a third person, an 
animal or a force of nature." 
The case at bar deals with the expectable actions 
of a force of nature. It is common knowledge that 
throughout the year in this part of the country there will 
be rain and snow. Wetness and a terrazzo surface when 
combined cause an unusually dangerous slipping hazzard. 
This hazzard is increased considerably when the ter-
razzo surface is sloped in a different direction than the 
sidewalk approach thereto. Defendant had a duty being 
the owner of this entranceway to know these facts, and 
is charged with such knowledge. On the other hand, 
this condition would not be apparent to the plaintiff and 
defendant is also charged with this knowledge. Under 
these circumstances defendant owed a duty to maintain 
its entranceway at all times in a safe condition. The 
means for keeping its entranceways safe were readily 
available. First, defendant could remain at all times 
alert to weather conditions. Second, defendant could by 
proper use of mats and/or feldspar prevent a slick and 
slippery condition from ever existing or in the alter-
native warn its customers of any dangerous condition 
that may exist. The dictates of ordinary care may very 
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well require under the facts of this case that rubber mats 
be left on the terrazzo entranceway at all times. 
The Karren case contains an interpretation by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals of the Erickson case. 
The Court stated at 190 F. 2d 711: 
"Here the appellee's own testimony establish-
es that it knew of the slippery condition of such 
floors when wet and that it instructed its porter 
to put additional non-skid material on the en-
tranceway under such condition. lTnder the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Utah, we think it 
became a question of fact for the jury's determin-
ation whether under the existing conditions appel-
lant exercised reasonable care for the safety of 
its invitees." 
The l(arren case was not even cited by defendant 
in its brief, and yet defendant cited an earlier case from 
the Tenth Circuit which involved an inside stairway 
and in which there was not even evidence of a wet surface, 
Sears-Roebttck & Co. v. Johnson, 91 F. 2d, 332 (1937). 
In describing the scope of defendant's duties, this 
court in the Erickson case stated at page 212: 
"While there is no evidence of any incident 
occurring which would have put the appellant on 
notice that the terrazzo was slippery when wet, 
such evidence is not necessary to establish lia-
bility on the part of the appellant. The latter was 
in the actual possession of the building and had a 
duty to search out defects in the premises in order 
that they be reasonably safe for the presence of 
business visitors." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
In the Erickson case, this court cited the case of 
Cardall v. Shortenberg's Inc., R.I. (1943) 69 R. I. 97, 31 
A. 2d 12, as authority for its holding. The Cardall case 
was also cited by the New Jersey court in the Brody 
case. In the Cardall case there was a terrazzo surface 
which had been laid a 1nonth or so prior to plaintiff's 
fall. This surface had a slope upward from the sidewalk 
to the door of from 3% to 4 inches in 10lj2 feet, less than 
in the case at bar. Also there was a slight slope sideways 
which is also indicated in the case at bar by the slope of 
5% inches in 10 feet of the sidewalk sloping south. The 
evidence as to the amount of abrasives in the terrazzo 
varied from 4% to 40%. The plaintiff testified that the 
terrazzo was wet and slippery at the time she fell. An 
expert testified that the terrazzo would become more 
slippery with water. The court in the Cardall case held 
that there was a jury question as to whether or not the 
terrazzo surface was dangerous in wet weather and 
whether or not defendant was negligent in failing to have 
a rubber mat or other protection on the terrazzo at the 
time of the injury. 
The dissent in the Erickson case in distinguishing 
that case from the Cardall case stated at page 218: 
"It might be that the case at bar could be dis-
tinguished from the Rhode Island case because of 
the difference in the slope of the entranceway or 
the time of the year." 
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It should be pointed out that the slope in the Car-
dall case was less than the slope in the case at bar. The 
Cardall case occurred on February 19 and the case at 
bar on November 30. It is clear that the facts in the case 
at bar are stronger in every detail than were the facts 
in the Erickson case. 
In regard to the slope situation in the case at bar, 
defendant appears to believe the fact that the sidewalk 
slopes down to the south with a slightly greater slope 
than exists on the terrazzo, inures to its favor. This 
situation, which defendant must be charged ·with know- i : 
ing, made the terrazzo entranceway even more hazard- I i 
ous and dangerous for this gives a customer two slopes 
instead of one to deal with. It can be seen that a person 
walking south on the sidewalk and entering Penneys 
would be walking downhill and stepping from a downhill 
slope to an uphill slope to the east. This situation re-
quires even greater care on defendant's part to avoid 
injuries to its customers. 
There are several cases which support and strength-
en the law as laid down in the Erickson, Karren, Brody 
and Cardall cases. 
Th8 case of Deschan~ps et al v. L. Bamberger, N.J. 
(1942) 27 A. 2d 3, involved a marble floor with a slope 
of 71;4 inches in about 15 feet with no water present. 
The court there held there to be a jury question of de-
fendant's negligence in failing to have a mat or other 
type of covering. 
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See also the following cases where the questions of 
negligence and contributory negligence were held to be 
for the jury. Barker v. Silverforb, Mo. (1947), 201 S.W. 
2d 408 (inherent quality of terrazzo floor considered sig-
nificant coupled with other factors); Becker, et al. v. 
David, C.A.D.C. (1950), 182 F. 2d 243 (hallway level 
floor made slippery with water tracked in); Indemnity 
Ins1trance Co. of North America v. Hinkle, C.A. 5th 
(1942), 127 F. 2d 655 (sloping tile surface on foyer floor, 
no water or foreign substance) ; Bankhead v. First Nat. 
Bank in St. Louis, Mo. (1940), 137 S.W. 2d 594 (marble 
steps inside bank, slippery from water tracked in); Pica-
riello et al. v. Linares & Rescigno Bank, N .. J. (1941), 21 
A. 2d 343 (level terassa floor inside bank made slippery 
by water tracked in); Williamson v. Derry Electric Co., 
N.H. (1938), 196 A. 265 (freshly waxed level floor in 
office made more slippery by water tracked in.) 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION AS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
The only evidence that defendant relies on in stating 
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law is that she was walking normally, that she 
noticed the floor was wet but didn't know it was slip-
pery, and that her husband knows of the propensities 
of terrazzo. 
In the Karren case in reply to the same contention 
made by the defendant the court stated (P. 711) that 
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plaintiff was familiar with the entranceway in question 
and no doubt had been in and out of the store on numer-
ous occasions. The court then went on to state : 
"* * * but there is no evidence in the record 
supporting a finding that she was familiar with 
terrazzo floors; that she had any knowledge as to 
their peculiar characteristics, or knew or had rea-
son to know that they were unduly slippery when 
wet. The evidence is that she walked in an ordin-
ary way in approaching and entering appellant's 
store." 
The evidence in the case at bar is practically identi-
cal to that in the Karren case. There is also the added 
factor in this case that as far as the record shows plain-
tiff had never been in the J. C. Penney entranceway prior 
to the injury. It will be remembered that 8he had only 
lived in Salt Lake about one year prior to the injury. 
There was no evidence that Mrs. DeWeese knew anything 
about the propensities of terrazzo surfaces. 
As to defendant's burden of proof on the issue of 
contributory negligence see the recent case of Gordon 
Ray, doing business under the name Ray Transportation 
ConLpany v. Consolidated Freightways (Nov. 2, 1955) 
298 P. 2d 196. In speaking of the refusal of the trial 
court to find a plaintiff contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law this court stated at P. 201: 
"It would only be when such refusal did such 
violence to common sense as to convince the court 
that no fact trier acting fairly and reasonably 
would refuse to make such finding that it would 
be reversed." 
I a 
I 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE. 
(a) THE EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM AND USAGE AD-
MITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER. 
Counsel for defendant, at page 19 of his brief, makes 
the following statement: 
"The record reveals that plaintiff sought to 
influence the jury by a constant and persistent 
line of questions and testimony relating to the 
practice, custom and condition of W. T. Grant 
stores in various localities in the United States 
as well as at Salt Lake." 
Counsel is utterly mistaken when he infers that 
evidence of a custom and practice of W. T. Grant 
stores outside Salt Lake City of using rubber mats 
and/or feldspar in inclement weather on terrazzo sur-
faces was admitted in evidence in this case. No such 
evidence is in the record. Counsel has apparently con-
fused the evidence that Mr. DeWeese had been employed 
by W. T. Grant Company at various of its stores through-
out the country and that these stores had terrazzo sur-
faces with evidence of a custom and practice. The evi-
dence concerning Mr. DeWeese's experience and familiar-
ity with terrazzo surfaces was introduced for the purpose 
of showing that he had a background of practical experi-
ence and knowledge with respect to the propensities and 
characteristics of terrazzo surfaces. He was applying 
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this experience when he testified that terrazzo surfaces 
have the propensity of becoming extremely slick and 
slippery when wet. His background of experience with 
terrazzo was clearly proper evidence which laid a 
foundation for his later testimony. 
The record further reveals that counsel for defend-
ant asked for no cautionary instructions, made no indi-
cation to the court that he felt he was prejudiced by any 
offer of such evidence in the presence of the jury, and 
made no motion for mistrial. As an afterthought coun-
sel now makes some vague complaint of prejudice. 
Counsel makes the following statement at page 19 
of his brief: 
"The beginning question was categorized by 
counsel as 'preliminary' and then boldly asserted 
to be admissible as a standard of care :" 
Counsel then quotes the following statement by Mr. 
Black as support for his contention: 
{ 
"Mr. Black. If your Honor, please, this has 
to do with a standard of care-this is evidence 
of a standard of care in connection with main-
tenance and upkeep of terrazzo entrance-way." 
Counsel for plaintiff never suggested to court or 
jury that the customs and practices of other business 
establishments in Salt Lake City, with respect to placing 
mats and/ or feldspar on terrazzo surfaces in inclement 
weather was an absolute standard of care. It was evi-
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dence which the jury could consider in deterrnining first, 
whether rubber mats and/or feldspar were practical for 
use in preventing slickness and slipperiness and, second, 
whether rubber mats and/or feldspar were readily avail-
able to defendant for the accomplishment of such pur-
pose. 
Evidence as to the customs and practices of W. T. 
Grant store and other stores in Salt Lake City of using 
rubber mats and/or feldspar on terrazzo surfaces in in-
clement weather was introduced. Counsel for defendant 
at the time of trial was much more magnanimous about 
this evidence than he appears to be in his present brief. 
At Record 73 he states as follows: 
"We think it perfectly permissible to show 
that, in this community, if he desires, we would 
be glad to stipulate that mats and feldspar are 
used on terrazzo during inclement weather. Cer-
tainly, we have no concern about that, but we 
don't feel we should be tied to the standard of 
care of that particular store, nor do we think 
that the acts of one particular store, if they put 
them out sooner or later-and we are talking 
probably of a matter of minutes-that that there-
by puts notice that J. C. Penney's would be negli-
gent, I don't think that is possible." 
The Court made the following statement outside 
the presence of the jury as to the theory under which he 
was admitting the foregoing evidence (R. 72): 
"THE COURT: - might take this, Miss 
Reporter; I think p1aintiff may show the nature 
of terrazzo floors, its slickness, its tendency to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
be slicker as it is wetter, if they want to; any-
thing with respect to the slope of it, as it affects 
the risk or danger of slickness. I think he may 
show what 1nay be done, if it is slick, to safeguard 
against it. I think he may show what steps are 
taken in this community-and, as far as that goes, 
that rnay cover the State of Utah-as protection 
against slipping. I think he n1ay offer as evidence 
of that what is done in this vicinity by others, as 
typical or illustrative. I don't think you can show 
what the policy of Grant is, let us say, outside of 
Utah-
"MR. BLACK: All right, Judge. 
"THE COURT: - or what the practice gen-
erally is outside of Utah, except as it might tend 
to show that a rubber mat or feldspar or some-
thing else is a safety protection, like a snow tire 
on a car or a chain on a car or gravel, sand, or 
cinders or salt on a hill that's a case of lessening 
the danger or guarding against it. I think that's 
in the proper realm of inquiry. 
"MR. AADNESEN: Yes, your Honor, I 
think-" 
In Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, C.C.A. 
lOth, 118 F. 2d 836, 841, the court stated: 
"It is admissible merely as some evidence of 
the nature of the thing in question because it indi-
cates what is the influence of the thing on the 
ordinary person in that same situation." 
In both the Erickson and the Karren cases, supra, 
there was evidence of the customs and practices of other 
stores in Salt Lake City having terrazzo entranceways. 
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Also, such evidence was introduced in the case of Brody 
v. Albert Lifson & Sons, Inc., supra. 
In the case of Royer v. Najarian, supra, plaintiff's 
expert testified that it was a common thing in Rhode Is-
land and everywhere to have terrazzo entranceways cov-
ered with rubber mats and that there was a sloping ter-
razzo floor in the passageway of the New IJ!dustrial 
Trust Building and that he had seen mats on that floor 
after a storm when the inside was wet. This evidence 
was allowed. 
In the case of Deschamps et al. v. L. Bamberger & Co., 
supra, exception was taken to the trial court allowing 
evidence over defendant's objection of the use of mats 
on the floors of the vestibules in similarly constructed 
places in the vicinity on the theory that such facts were 
not in issue under the pleadings, or the plaintiff's theory 
of liability. The court held that where the complaint 
charged defendant with maintaining a dangerous floor, 
the evidence concerning mats was proper. 
The theory of admissibility of evidence of the volun-
tary conduct of others is expressed in Paragraph 461, 
Wigmore on Evidence. Wigmore cites as examples, a 
person indoors observing whether or not passers by have 
their umbrellas lifted to determine if it is raining; a 
person, in ascertaining if a hill is too icy to attempt it in 
his car without tire chains observing whether or not 
other cars lacking chains are skidding; a person o bserv-
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ing work1nen in a powder factory wearing felt shoes in-. 
fering that the tendency of the powder was to explode 
frmn the concussion or friction of ordinary shoes. 
So in the case at bar the conduct of other store owner:-; 
in the vicinity with regard to their terrazzo entranceways 
in wet weather tends to show the propensity of terrazzo 
surfaces to become slick when wet and that rubber mats 
and feldspar are practical and available ways in which to 
obviate the dangerous condition. 
(b) DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY AD- I I 
MISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCEDED BY DEFENSE COUN- l p 
SEL TO BE "PERFECTLY ADMISSIBLE", AND STIPULAT-
ED TO BE TRUE. 
Counsel for defendant states in his brief at page 19: 
"Admittedly the defendant J. C. Penney Com-
pany used mats and feldspar during inclement 
weather just as they were used by other stores on 
Main Street including W. T. Grant." 
Furthermore, counsel stated during the trial "We 
think it perfectly admissible to show that, in the com-
Inunity if he desires, we would be glad to stipulate that 
mats and feldspar are used on terrazzo during inclement 
weather." 
Also the evidence as to the custom and practice of 
other stores in this cmnmunity was illicited from the 
various witnesses without objection by defense counsel. 
Such evidence was offered in evidence in support of 
plaintiff's contention that J. C. Penney's Co. should like-
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wise have such a custom and practice. When counsel con-
ceded that J. C. Penney's Co. did have such a custom and 
practice any possible prejudice to defendant from custom 
and practice evidence vanished. The ultimate fact had 
been admitted. There remained only the question of 
whether defendant had negligently failed to follow its 
own custom and practice, and whether this failure was 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
In State v. Olsen, (1945) 160 P. 2d 427, 108 U. 377, 
defendant was being prosecuted for n1anslaughter. The 
evidence was that defendant had fallen asleep at the 
wheel of an automobile. Defendant admitted all the facts 
of the accident. On appeal defendant complained of the 
allowance in evidence of a map containing testimonial 
statements, said document having been prepared by one 
of the witnesses. This court stated: 
"Because all of the facts of the accident in 
question were admitted by defendant we can see 
no prejudicial error in the use of this map and 
for this reason shall not enter into an academic 
discussion of the rules governing the use of maps 
and other testimonial documents." 
Another Utah case is Sc.Jvofield v. Zion's Co-op Mer-
cantile Institute, (1934) 39 P. 2d 342, 85 U. 281. This 
was a suit for pension under an agreement between 
defendant and plaintiff. At the trial plaintiff introduced 
letters from defendant as to the allowance of the pension. 
On appeal defendant complained of the allowance of such 
letters in evidence. This court held that the letters 
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were ad1nissible and further stated that since there was 
no dispute in the record of the facts recited :in the letters 
that no prejudice could result to the defendant. 
Defendant in the case at bar is in the anomalous 
position of complaining about evidence concerning cus-
tom and practice in this connnunity when defendant 
admits that it had such a custom in its own store. The 
evidence of the rapid inquiry made by Mr. Davies as 
to whether or not the rubber mats were out and his 
frantic effort to get feldspar on the terrazzo indicate 
that someone had failed to discharge his responsibility 
and that defendant had failed to follow its own custom. 
In the face of defendant's admissions and the undisputed 
evidence defendant could not possibly have been preju-
diced by the admission in evidence of the customs and 
practices of other stores in the community. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT IS FORECLOSED FROM OBJECTING TO 
ADMISSION OF LOCAL CUSTOM AND USAGE EVIDENCE 
BY COUNSEL'S F AlLURE TO EXCEPT TO SUCH EVI-
DENCE AND BY HIS F AlLURE TO REQUEST A LIMITING 
INSTRUCTION. 
At page 19 of his brief counsel for defendant states: 
"1\{r. DeWeese was both directly and indir-
ectly allowed to set a standard of care by com-
parison." 
In his next breath counsel admits that J. C. Penney 
Company "used mats and feldspar during inclement 
i I 
I • 
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weather, just as they were used by other stores on Main 
Street including W. T. Grants." 
Counsel then states at page 21 of his brief: 
"The testimony admitted in evidence was not 
explained by the court as to its purpose nor was 
it commented on in the instructions." 
Counsel for defendant at no time suggested to the trial 
court that the purpose of the evidence of custom and 
practice should be limited. At the conclusion of the evi-
dence he submitted no requested instruction concerning 
such evidence. But now he states that the evidence was 
';
1 not limited to a specific purpose. If the evidence was ad-
missible for any purpose it was proper and if counsel 
for defendant wished the evidence to be limited to a 
specific purpose it was his duty to so indicate to the court 
both at the time the evidence was admitted and later 
when he submitted his requested instructions. Counsel 
for defendant took neither of these expedients. Further-
more, counsel has never quite determined even yet just 
how the concededly admissible evidence of custom and 
practice should have been limited. 
In Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. I, page 300, para-
graph 13, it is said: 
"In other words, when an evidentiary fact 
is offered for one purpose, and becomes admis-
sible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it 
in that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it 
does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
other capacity and because the jury n1ight im-
properly consider it in the latter capacity. This 
doctrine, though involving certain risks, is indis-
pensable as a practical rule: 
* * * * 
"Here the only question can ·be what the 
proper means are for avoiding the risk of mis-
using the evidence. It is uniformly conceded that 
the instruction of the court suffices for that pur-
pose; and the better opinion is that the opponent 
of the evidence must ask for that instruction; 
otherwise, he may be supposed to have waived it 
as unnecessary for his protection:" 
(Citing numerous cases including State v. Greene, 
33 U. 497, 94 P. 987). 
The Utah law is set forth in State v. Greene, 33 l7. 
497, 94 P. 987. That case involved a prosecution for 
adultery. The Court admitted in evidence over objection 
a deed wherein defendant and Grace D. Greene were 
grantors with an acknowledgment stating "personally 
appeared before me Webster Greene and Grace D. 
Greene, husband and wife, the signers of the above in-
strument." The objection was to the use of the evidence 
for any purpose. The defendant made no request for 
an instruction to limit the use that the jury could make 
of the evidence. This court conceded that this evidence 
was inadmissible as a declaration of Grace D. Greene but 
held that it was admissible as an admission by defend-
ant. The court states at P. 988: 
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" 'It follows that an objection to evidence, 
where a part is competent and part incompetent,· 
may be overruled without available error, in 
cases where counsel interposes the objection to 
all the evidence.' * * * And furthermore, the rule 
as declared by the great weight of authority seems 
to be that evidence which is competent for certain 
purposes, and is incompetent for other purposes, 
but is admitted generally, it is incumbent upon 
the party objecting to its reception, if he de-
sires to have the effect of such evidence limited 
to the specific purpose for which it is admissible, 
to ask the court to inform the jury by appropri-
ate instructions as to the purpose for which they 
may consider the evidence, and, if he fails to make 
the request, he cannot afterwards be heard to 
complain." (Citing numerous cases.) 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented jury questions as to defend-
ant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The jury with the approval of the trial court resolved 
these issues in plaintiff's favor. The record reveals that 
no improper testimony was admitted in evidence by the 
court, and no exceptions to the complained of evidence 
were taken by defense counsel. Furthermore, counsel 
for defendant has utterly failed to discharge his burden 
of showing that defendant was prejudiced by any act or 
ruling of the trial court. Counsel made no such complaint 
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of prejudice at the time of trial, and asked for no instruc-
tion limiting the use of any evidence. Under the fore-
going circumstances it is respectfully submitted that the 
Erickson and Karren cases should be reaffirmed by the 
sustaining of plaintiff's verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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